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Abstract: We address the question of how finitely additive moral value 
theories (such as utilitarianism) should rank worlds when there are an infinite 
number of locations of value (people, times, etc.). In a recent contribution, 
Hamkins and Montero have argued that Weak Pareto is implausible in the 
infinite case and defended alternative principles. We here defend Weak Pareto 
against their criticisms and argue against an isomorphism principle that they 
defend. Where locations are the same in both worlds but have no natural order, 
our argument leads to an endorsement, and strengthening, of a principle 
defended by Vallentyne and Kagan, and to an endorsement of a weakened 
version of the catching-up criterion developed by Atsumi and by von 
Weizsäcker. 
 
1. Introduction 
Call a theory of moral value finitely additive just in case it morally ranks 
worlds with finitely many locations of value on the basis of the sum of the 
values at each location. Utilitarianism is a paradigm finitely additive theory of 
value (with people as the locations of value, and welfare as the conception of 
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value). There has been much debate about how finitely additive moral theories 
should rank worlds when there are infinitely many locations of value. The 
problem is that when there are infinitely many locations of value, the sums 
may be infinite or may not exist at all and thus may provide no guidance for 
ranking worlds with infinitely many locations. Many authors, however, 
believe that not all worlds with infinite sums are equally valuable. Vallentyne 
and Kagan (1997), for example, have argued that a world with an infinite 
number of people each having two units of value (e.g., happiness) is morally 
better than a world with the same people but each having only one unit of 
value. The sums in both cases, however, are infinite.1  
The core idea that Vallentyne and Kagan (and others) appeal to and 
defend is a Pareto principle: 
 
Weak Pareto: If two worlds U and V have the same locations, and 
each location has more goodness in U than it does in V, then U is 
                                               
1
 In the 1920s, Frank Plumpton Ramsey discovered the problem of 
aggregating utilities over an infinite time horizon. This problem was further 
analyzed in growth theory and in social choice theory; see for instance, 
Koopmans (1960), Atsumi (1965), Von Weizsäcker (1965), Lauwers (1998), 
and Fleurbaey and Michel (2003). In philosophy, the problem was 
independently discovered, and a solution proposed, by Segerberg (1976). 
More recently, the problem was rediscovered by Nelson (1991), and a solution 
was proposed by Vallentyne (1993). 
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better than V.2 
 
This principle gives the desired judgement in the above example (that 
everyone with 2 units is better than the same people with only 1 unit). 
Vallentyne and Kagan develop and defend various strengthenings of Weak 
Pareto. 
In a recent contribution, Hamkins and Montero (2000) have argued 
that Weak Pareto is implausible in the infinite case (although quite plausible in 
the finite case), and defended alternative principles. We shall here defend 
Weak Pareto against their criticisms and argue against an isomorphism 
principle that they defend. Where locations are the same in both worlds, but 
have no natural order, our argument leads to an endorsement, and 
strengthening, of a principle defended by Vallentyne and Kagan, and to an 
endorsement of a weakened version of the catching-up criterion developed by 
Atsumi and by von Weizsäcker. 
 Throughout, it’s important to keep in mind that our arguments are 
addressed to those who accept finite additivity of value (e.g., utilitarians). 
They are not meant to defend finite additivity against those who reject it (e.g., 
egalitarians). The issue concerns how finite additivity should be extended 
when there are infinitely-many locations of value. 
 
2. Background 
Throughout we focus on the ranking of worlds on the basis of the relation of 
                                               
2
 This is a special case of their Basic Idea. 
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being morally at least as good. We assume, as do Hamkins and Montero (and 
virtually everyone else), that this ranking of worlds is transitive:  
 
Transitivity: If a world U is at least as good as V, and V is at least as 
good as W, then U is at least as good as W.  
 
As usual, a world is better than a second just in case it is at least as 
good but not vice versa, and a world is equally good as a second just in case it 
is at least as good and vice versa. We do not assume completeness (that, for 
any two worlds, one of them is at least as good as the other). When there are 
an infinite number of locations of value, completeness is difficult to achieve in 
a plausible explicitly stated ranking.3 
 Although we shall be concerned with cases where the total value in a 
world is infinite, we limit our attention throughout (as do Hamkins and 
Montero) to cases where the value at each location is finite. We shall, that is, 
only be considering cases where infinite total value arises from the sum of 
infinitely many finite values. Moreover, we assume throughout that the 
number of locations is countably infinite. 
                                               
3
 Fleurbaey and Michel (2003, p. 794) conjecture that there does not exist an 
explicit discription of a complete rule that satisfies loose Pareto (see below, 
Section 3) and a weak infinite version of Suppes indifference (to wit, 
indifference to finite permutations). They conjecture that although such rules 
exist, proof of their existence involves some version of the axiom of choice (or 
the weaker ultrafilter axiom). 
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 We further assume, again in agreement with Hamkins and Montero, 
the following principle: 
 
Sum: If, for each of two worlds, the sum of the values at their 
locations exists and is finite, then the first world is at least as good as 
the second world if and only if its sum is at least as great.4 
 
This principle asserts that, even in the infinite case, worlds should be ranked 
on the basis of their summed goodness—if these sums exist and are finite. The 
whole problem with ranking infinite worlds (i.e., worlds with infinitely many 
locations of value) is that often the sums are infinite or do not exist. Where 
finite sums exist, there is no problem. The ranking should be done on the basis 
of the sums (as in the finite case). Thus, for example, if a world has an infinite 
number of people with value (e.g., happiness) levels (on some arbitrary 
ordering of the individuals) of 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, etc., and a second world has 
an infinite number of people with value levels of .9, 0,0,0, etc., then the first 
world is better than the second world. It’s a mathematical fact that the first 
sum is one and the second is .9. 
 In the infinite case, Sum must be applied with caution. If locations of 
value have a natural order5—as points in time do—then it can be applied 
                                               
4
 In Fishkind, Hamkins, and Montero (2002), Sum is considered a rock-bottom 
principle for additive theories. 
5
 See Vallentyne and Kagan (1997) for a discussion of the tricky notion of 
“natural” order. 
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straightforwardly using the natural order. If, however, locations have no 
natural order (e.g., as in the case of people), then the sum exists and is finite if 
and only if no matter how the values are ordered, the corresponding series 
converges to the same finite number (absolute convergence). For example, 
1/2+1/4+1/8+1/16… converges absolutely to 1, but 1/2-1/3+1/4-1/5… 
converges only conditionally (to about .307). This latter convergence is 
conditional because rearranged as (1/2+1/4)-1/3+(1/6+1/8+1/10)-1/5… the 
series diverges to positive infinity. Hence, there is no sum for this series. 
Furthermore, even if the order is kept fixed, the sum exists only if the 
grouping of terms (by parentheses) does not affect the result. For example, 
1+(-1+1)+(-1+1)… converges conditionally to 1, but the convergence is not 
unconditional, since (1-1)+(1-1)+(1-1)… converges conditionally to 0. Thus, 
no sum exists for this series. 
 Let us now turn to the criticism of Weak Pareto that Hamkins and 
Montero raise. 
 
3. Isomorphism and Loose Pareto 
Hamkins and Montero ask us to consider the assessment of soccer teams in the 
game of “infinite soccer”. Each team has an infinite number of players, all of 
whom play at any given time (there are no extras). Furthermore, each player is 
assumed—solely for reasons of simplicity of illustration—to be equally good 
at all positions. (The fact that there are specialized positions on a soccer team 
is irrelevant to the point of the example.) Consider a team for which the talent 
levels of the players are as follows: 
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Player: … a
-2 a-1 a0 a1 a2 … 
Team A … -2 -1 0 1 2 … 
 
Table 1 
This table indicates that player ak has a talent level equal to k units (on some 
scale of measurement). 
The coach of the team wants to improve his team. There is a trainer 
able to raise the talent level of each player by one unit. Should the coach 
engage this trainer? According to Weak Pareto, the answer appears to be yes. 
Let A′  be Team A after the training. The results would be as follows: 
 
Player: … a
-2 a-1 a0 a1 a2 … 
Team A … -2 -1 0 1 2 … 
Team A' … -1 0 1 2 3 … 
 
Table 2 
 
Applying Weak Pareto to the talent levels of the players, Team A’ (i.e. 
team A after the training) is better than team A. Each player has more skill and 
this makes the team better. Hamkins and Montero, however, believe this is the 
wrong answer. They believe that the training has no effect, that Team A’ is 
equally good as Team A. Their claim is based upon the following principle: 
 
Isomorphism: Any world is equally as good as any isomorphic copy. 
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Worlds are isomorphic just in case they have the same structure (or patterns) 
with respect to value at locations. If there is no natural structure to locations 
(as in the case of people), then one world is isomorphic to another just in case 
there is a one-to-one mapping from the locations of one world onto the 
locations of the other such that the value at a given location in one world is the 
same as the value at its corresponding location in the other world. (In this case, 
Isomorphism implies the well known Anonymity condition.) If there is a 
natural structure to locations (as in the case of points of time), the mapping 
must also respect that structure (e.g., if time t1 is one year earlier than time t2, 
then the counterpart of t1 must be one year earlier than the counterpart of t2). 
Hamkins and Montero argue that Isomorphism is plausible on the 
ground that it is the pattern of value and not the specific locations of value that 
matters. In particular, in the case of the infinite soccer team, the team has the 
same pattern of value after training as it did before. For any given level of 
talent displayed by a member of the team after training (e.g., that of ak), there 
was someone with that level of talent before training (namely ak+1). If the 
distribution of talent is the same, there is, they claim, no reason to think that 
the team is any better. Weak Pareto is thus, they claim, mistaken. 
 We shall argue against Isomorphism. First, however, it’s important to 
note that Weak Pareto cannot be so straightforwardly applied in the above 
example. When dealing with the infinite case (unlike the finite case), it is 
extremely important to specify what the basic locations of value are (people, 
points in time, etc.). This is because in the infinite case it is possible, for 
example, for one world to be better for every single person but worse at every 
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single point in time.6 Hence, it’s crucial to know whether persons or points in 
times are the basic bearers of value. (In the case of moral theory, the most 
natural assumption is, of course, that people are the basic locations.) 
Throughout, the principles that we defend should be understood as applying to 
basic locations of value—and not to just any arbitrary locations. 
In light of this, we need to reconsider the above assessments of the 
infinite soccer team. In applying Weak Pareto, it was implicitly assumed that 
individual players were the basic locations of values. This assumption, 
however, seems implausible. Suppose that each player improves by one unit 
and then takes on the position previously held by the player who previously 
had one unit more of talent. In this case, at each position, the talent of the 
player is unchanged. We fully agree that in this case the team is not improved. 
Weak Pareto applied to positions (and not individual players) is silent in this 
case. The values at each position are unchanged, and hence Weak Pareto 
(which requires that the value be increased at each basic location) does not 
apply. Consider, however, a version of the above example in which the talent 
of the player at each position is improved by one unit. In this case, 
assuming—as we shall—that positions are the basic locations of value for 
assessing the value (talent) of a soccer team, and that positions have at most a 
merely ordinal order (e.g., no natural center position), Weak Pareto does 
                                               
6
 For an ingenious example, see Cain (1995). For analyses emphasizing the 
importance of the prior determination of the basic locations of value, see 
Vallentyne (1995) and Mulgan (2002). We here appeal to Mulgan’s analysis 
of the soccer game example. 
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indeed hold that the soccer team has improved. Isomorphism, on the other 
hand, holds that the team has not improved. Therefore, there is a genuine 
conflict between Weak Pareto and Isomorphism. In what follows, then, we 
shall focus on the “increase at each position” version of this example. 
Hamkins and Montero argue that Weak Pareto should be replaced with 
a related principle (which they call “Fundamental Idea”, but which we re-label 
to highlight its Pareto character): 
 
Loose Pareto (aka: Fundamental Idea): If two worlds U and V have 
the same locations and each location has at least as much goodness in 
U than it does in V, then U is at least as good as V. 
 
Compared with Weak Pareto, this principle is weaker in some respects and 
stronger in others. It is weaker in that when each location has more in U than it 
does in V, it only requires that U be at least as good as V (as opposed to being 
better, as required by Weak Pareto). Loose Pareto is stronger than Weak 
Pareto in that it applies to all cases where each location has at least as much 
goodness in U as it does in V (and not merely to cases where each location has 
more goodness in U). 
Loose Pareto is plausible, but so is, we shall argue, Weak Pareto. 
Isomorphism, on the other hand, is not plausible, and we shall argue against it.  
 
4. Against Isomorphism 
The starting point of our argument is the conjunction of Sum and Loose 
Pareto, which are two basic principles for finitely additive theories. Below we 
 11 
introduce and defend a third principle that we label “Zero Independence”. 
Those who accept Sum, Loose Pareto, and this third principle, must reject 
Isomorphism. 
In our discussion, we restrict Isomorphism to cases were the locations in 
the two worlds are the same.7 Then, Isomorphism-like principles boil down to 
Suppes-indifference conditions: what type of rearrangements of the values 
over the set of locations keep a world equally good. Numerous authors have 
pointed out the conflicts between Suppes-indifference conditions and Pareto 
principles.8 Here, as already announced, we take another route against 
Isomorphism. 
Consider a case involving a soccer team with infinitely many players. The 
players are all beginners and they each have a talent level equal to zero. A 
trainer shows up and improves the talent of one player (b0) by one unit. All 
                                               
7
 If locations are not assumed to be the same, Isomorphism faces the following 
additional problem when (i) the (infinite) set of locations of one world 
constitute a proper subset of locations of a second world, and (ii) each location 
contains one unit of value. If the locations have no natural structure, the two 
worlds are isomorphic (because they can be put into a one-to-one 
correspondence) and thus Isomorphism holds that they are equally valuable. 
On the other hand, it seems quite implausible for finitely additive value 
theories to judge the two worlds equally good since one world has all the value 
of the first world plus much more. 
8
 See, for example, Vallentyne (1995), Van Liedekerke (1995), Ng (1995), and 
Lauwers (1998). 
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players stay in the same position. The talent levels of the initial team, Team B, 
and the team after training, Team B′, are thus as follows: 
 
Position: … b
-2 b-1 b0 b1 b2 … 
Team B … 0 0 0 0 0 … 
Team B’ … 0 0 1 0 0 … 
 
Table 3 
 
Does this training improve the quality of the team? The intuitive 
answer, without any doubt, is yes. The player at one of the positions has 
become a better player and no player at any position has become a worse 
player. Furthermore, Sum makes this judgement as well. The sum of the 
values of the players at each position in Team B′ is one, and the sum for Team 
B is zero. Given that the sums exist and are finite, Sum says that Team B′ is 
better than Team B.  
 Consider now some training applied to Team B′. The talent level of 
each position other than b0 (the only position whose talent improved from the 
first training program) is increased by one unit. This produces Team B′′: 
 
Position: … b
-2 b-1 b0 b1 b2 … 
Team B … 0 0 0 0 0 … 
Team B′ … 0 0 1 0 0 … 
Team B′′ … 1 1 1 1 1 … 
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Table 4 
 
Intuitively it is plausible that Team B′′ is better than Team B′. After all, one 
position’s talent did not change, and everyone else’s talent improved. Here, 
however, we only insist on the weaker claim that Team B′′ is at least as good 
as (as opposed to better than) B′. This judgement is endorsed by Loose Pareto 
(which is endorsed by Hamkins and Montero). 
We have, then, the following intermediate result: B′′ is at least as good 
as B′ (by Loose Pareto), and B′ is better than B (by Sum). It follows (by 
Transitivity) that B′′ is better than B. Thus, in at least some cases, the fact that 
one world has more value at every location than a second world does 
guarantee—as claimed by Weak Pareto—that it is a better world. This does 
not, however, establish Weak Pareto, which makes the much stronger claim 
that this is always so. Nor does it challenge Isomorphism, since there is no 
isomorphism involved in this case. We shall argue, however, that if we add 
one plausible assumption, then Weak Pareto follows, and Isomorphism must 
be rejected. 
The crucial point about the above example is that for both B and B′ the 
sums of the values at the locations are finite and could thus be used to rank 
them. Let us extend the example to see the significance of this. Suppose that 
the trainer returns to B′′ and once again improves the talent of position b0 by 
one unit (just as he did in improving B to B′) to produce Team B*. Suppose 
further that the trainer returns later to B* and improves the talent of all 
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remaining positions by one unit (just as he did in improving B′ to B′′) to 
produce Team B**. We have then: 
 
Position: … b
-2 b-1 b0 b1 b2 … 
Team B … 0 0 0 0 0 … 
Team B′ … 0 0 1 0 0 … 
Team B′′ … 1 1 1 1 1 … 
Team B* … 1 1 2 1 1 … 
Team B** … 2 2 2 2 2 … 
 
Table 5 
In comparing B′′, B* and B**, Loose Pareto yields the judgement that 
B** is at least as good as B*, which is at least as good as B′′—just as it did in 
comparing B, B′, and B′′. We cannot, however, here apply Sum to get the 
judgements that B* and B** are each better than B′′ (as we did in the case of 
B, B′, and B′′). This is because the sums are infinite for these three worlds. 
Surely, however, we should be able to make the comparable judgements here 
as well. After all, the improvements made in moving from B′′ to B* to B** are 
the same as the respective improvements made in moving from B to B′  to B′′. 
In both cases, the first improvement was to improve one position’s talent by 
one unit, and the second improvement was to improve the talent of all 
remaining positions by one unit. So, if B′ and B′′ are better than B, then B* and 
B** are better than B′′. 
The following principle captures the idea that the ranking of two 
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worlds is determined by the pattern of local differences. It appeals to the 
notion of world value “addition” understood as follows (where we also define 
world value “subtraction” for future reference). For two worlds, U and V, with 
the same locations, U+V (respectively, U-V) is a world with the same 
locations, with the value at each location equal to value at U at that location 
plus (respectively, minus) the value at V at that location. For example, if U has 
4 at each location, and V has 3, then U+V has 7 at each location, and U-V has 
1 at each location. Here, then, is the principle: 
 
Zero Independence: If U, V, and W are worlds with the same 
locations, then U is at least as good as V if and only if the world U+W 
is at least as good as V+W.9 
 
 This principle has the effect of saying that the ranking of two worlds is 
determined by the pattern of differences in local value. To see this clearly, 
understand the zero world of a given world to be a world with the same 
locations but with zero units of value at each location. If we let W  be –V (the 
complement of V, i.e., -k at each location at which V has value k), then Zero 
Independence says that U is at least at good as V if and only if U-V is at least 
as good as its zero world. The ranking of U and V, that is, depends only on the 
pattern of differences in local value at the two worlds, and not on the particular 
values present at those locations. Zero Independence says, for example, that, 
                                               
9
 Hervé Moulin (1991, page 36) uses ‘Zero Independence’ to characterize 
finite utilitarianism. 
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above, the ranking of B* relative to B′′ is the same as that of B*-B′′ relative to 
its zero world. B*-B′′ just is B′ and its zero world just is B. Hence, B* is better 
than B′′ because B′ is, according to Sum, better than B. 
Zero Independence on its own has no implications for how any two 
worlds are ranked. It is rather a consistency condition that requires that 
judgements by other principles be made in a certain way.10 The important 
point to note is that it allows judgements about a world ranking relative to its 
zero world to be applied to judgements about the ranking of two other worlds 
having the same locations and the same relative differences of local value. It 
thus allows the power of Sum to be exported to cases in which finite sums do 
not exist. In the above example, it permits B* to be judged better than B′′ even 
though neither world has a finite sum. It does this because B*-B′′ and its zero 
world do have finite sums.11 
 Let us now apply Zero Independence to the original example given by 
                                               
10
 Of course, the imposition of Zero Independence rules out those rankings 
that do not satisfy the principle. Nevertheless it is clear that on the basis of 
Zero Independence alone, nothing can be said about how to rank two 
particular worlds. Finally, it’s worth noting that Zero Independence entails the 
following Complement Principle, endorsed by Hamkins and Montero: If world 
U is at least as good as world V, then the complement of V is at least as good 
as the complement of U. 
11
 Zero worlds always have a finite sum of zero, but the “value subtraction” of 
one world from another does not always have a finite sum. B**-B*, for 
example, does not have a finite sum. 
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Hamkins and Montero (where the talent level of each position is one unit 
greater in A’ than in A). Team A′-A has the following local values: 
 
Position: … a
-2 a-1 a0 a1 a2 … 
Team A’-A … 1 1 1 1 1 … 
 
Table 6 
 
Above, we established that Team B′′ was better than Team B (using Sum and 
Loose Pareto). We can here use the exact same logic to establish that A′-A is 
better than its zero world (indeed, if the locations are the same, A′-A just is B′′ 
and the zero world of A′-A just is B). Applying Zero Independence we get the 
result that A′ is better than A—as claimed by Weak Pareto, and as denied by 
Isomorphism. 
More generally, the above reasoning shows that Sum conjoined with 
Loose Pareto and Zero Independence entails Weak Pareto. Indeed, that 
conjunction entails the following stronger version of Pareto: 
 
Strong Pareto: If two worlds U and V have the same locations, every 
location has at least as much goodness in U as it does in V, and at 
least one location has more goodness in U than in V, then U is better 
than V. 
 
Weak Pareto judges a world as better than a second world if it is better at all 
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locations, whereas strong Pareto makes this judgement as long as it is better at 
some locations and no worse anywhere else. Strong Pareto thus implies Weak 
Pareto but not vice-versa. 
Generalizing the arguments of the previous examples, one obtains the 
following theorem (proof omitted): 
 
Theorem 1: The conjunction of Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and 
Zero Independence entails Strong Pareto (and hence Weak Pareto).12 
 
 In the context of Sum and Zero Independence, then, Loose Pareto—
which is endorsed by Hamkins and Montero—leads to Strong Pareto (as well 
as Weak Pareto). Given that Isomorphism is incompatible with Weak Pareto, 
the issue here boils down to a conflict between Isomorphism and Zero 
Independence. We claim that Zero Independence is more plausible, and hence 
that Isomorphism should be rejected. This claim is, of course, a controversial 
claim that can be consistently denied. We believe, however, that we can 
                                               
12
 It might seem strange that we prove Strong Pareto on the basis of Sum and 
other conditions, given that in finite contexts Sum trivially entails Strong 
Pareto. In infinite contexts, however, the two principles are independent. Sum, 
but not Strong Pareto, is silent when one world has an infinite sum and the 
second world is a Pareto improvement. In any case, the crucial point here is 
that  
Hamkins and Montero accept Sum, and we are trying to appeal to conditions 
that they accept. 
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provide enough reasons for accepting it within the context of finitely additive 
value theory. As with most philosophical claims, our claims of plausibility 
(here and below) must be understood as claims put forward as part of an on-
going debate and investigation. 
 Zero Independence holds that the ranking of two worlds is determined 
by the pattern of differences in local value. This, we claim, is highly plausible 
in the context of finitely additive value theories. In the finite case, finitely 
additive value theories always satisfy Zero Independence. Although they 
typically get expressed as judging a world as at least as good as another 
(having the same locations) if and only if its total value is at least as great, the 
reference to the total is not needed. An equivalent statement is that one world 
as at least as good as the second if and only if the sum of the differences in 
value is at least as great as zero. Only the pattern of differences matters. Even 
in the infinite case, Zero Independence is “partially” implied by Sum and 
Loose Pareto. Sum ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if Sum ranks 
U-V as at least as good as its zero world. Moreover, if two worlds U and V 
satisfy the antecedent clause of Loose Pareto, then Loose Pareto ranks U as at 
least as good as V if and only if it ranks U-V above its zero world. Zero 
Independence is thus, we claim, highly plausible for finitely additive theories. 
Zero Independence is equivalent to a condition in social choice theory 
known as Translation Scale Invariance when it is restricted to the case where 
locations are the same.13 This latter condition holds that interlocational 
comparisons of zero points are irrelevant to the ranking of worlds. The zero 
                                               
13
 See, for example, Bossert and Weymark (forthcoming 2003). 
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point for value at each location, that is, can be set independently of how it is 
set for other locations (although, of course, when comparing two worlds, the 
zero point used for a given location in one world must also be used for that 
location in the second world). For example, if a location has values of 10 in 
world U and 5 in world V, both measured on the basis of some particular zero 
point (the same for both worlds), those values could be changed to 7 and 2 (by 
making the zero point 3 units higher for that location), and this, according to 
Translation Scale Invariance, would not alter how the two worlds are ranked. 
Zero Independence is equivalent to Translation Scale Invariance 
(restricted to the case where locations are the same), since any change in the 
zero points for the locations in worlds U and V can, for some W, be 
represented by U+W and V+W. (For example, if there are just two people, and 
the first person’s zero point is decreased by two units, and the second person’s 
zero point is increased by one unit, then the resulting two representations of 
the value of U and V are simply U+W and V+W, where W is <2,-1>.) Zero 
Independence and Translation Scale Invariance thus each hold that U ≥ V if 
and only if U+W ≥ V+W. 
Translation Scale Invariance (and hence, Zero Independence) is highly 
plausible for finitely additive value theories. (Recall that our goal is to defend 
a particular extension of finite additivity, not to defend finite additivity against 
non-additive theories.) If there is no natural zero point that separates positive 
from negative value (if there is just more or less value with no natural 
separating point), then any particular zero point is arbitrary (not representing a 
real aspect of value). In this case, interlocational comparisons of zero-points 
are uncontroversially irrelevant. If, on the other hand, there is a natural zero 
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for value, it is still plausible for finitely additive value theories to hold that it is 
irrelevant for ranking worlds. What matters (e.g., from a utilitarian 
perspective), as argued above, are the differences in value at each location 
between two worlds—not the absolute level of values at locations. No 
interlocational comparison of zero points is needed for this purpose. 
Isomorphism is not, we claim, as plausible as Zero Independence. In 
the finite case, Isomorphism is indeed plausible, but in the finite case it is not 
possible for there to be (1) a structure-respecting correspondence between the 
locations of two worlds such that the value at each location in one world is the 
same as the value at its counterpart location in the second world (i.e., an 
isomorphism), and also (2) a structure-respecting correspondence between the 
locations of two worlds such that the value at each location in one world is 
greater than the value at its counterpart location in the second world. In the 
infinite case, however, both kinds of correspondences may hold between two 
worlds (e.g., between the infinite soccer team before and after training). When 
both kinds of correspondences exist, it is implausible to hold that the two 
worlds are equally valuable.14 
                                               
14
 We do not deny that some isomorphism-like principles are valid. We 
believe, for example, that the following principle is valid (where an identity-
preserving counterpart function is one that maps a location onto itself, if it 
exists in both worlds): if two worlds are such that all identity-preserving and 
structure-respecting counterpart functions are value-isomorphisms (i.e., ensure 
that counterparts have the same value), then they are equally valuable. We are 
skeptical that this principle remains valid if the “all” is weakened to “some”, 
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Zero Independence is, we conclude, more plausible for finitely additive 
value theories than Isomorphism. Given that they conflict in the context of 
Sum and Loose Pareto, Isomorphism should be rejected. 
 This concludes our defense of Weak (and Strong) Pareto and our 
criticism of Isomorphism. We shall now identify the ranking relation 
generated by the conjunction of Sum, Loose Pareto, and Zero Independence 
and show that it is slightly stronger than a principle defended by Vallentyne 
and Kagan and that it is equivalent to a weakened version of the catching-up 
criterion developed by Atsumi and by von Weizsäcker. 
 
5. Differential Betterness and Indifference 
The conjunction of Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and Zero Independence 
results in the following rule for ranking any two worlds U and V. In 
accordance with Zero Independence, this ranking can be done by comparing 
U-V with its zero world. To do this, select those locations in U-V at which 
there is a non-negative amount of goodness. If there are some such locations, 
set G equal to their sum. If there are no such locations, set G to zero. G is 
either a non-negative finite number or infinite. Next, select those locations 
with a negative amount. If there are some such locations, set L equal to their 
sum. If there are no such locations, set L equal to zero. L is either a non-
positive finite number or minus infinity. Now, we distinguish the following 
cases: 
1. If both G and L are finite numbers, then U is at least as good as V if and 
                                                                                                                           
but have not argued this point here. 
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only if G+L ≥  0. 
2. If G is infinity and L is a finite number, then U is better than V. 
3. If G is a finite number and L is minus infinity, then V is better than U. 
4. If both G and L are infinite, then no judgement is made. 
 
This principle can usefully be broken into the following two principles, 
where infinity is understood to be greater than any finite number and negative 
infinity understood to be less than any finite number: 
 
Differential Betterness: For any two worlds U and V having the same 
locations, if the sum of the non-negative local values of U-V is (finitely 
or infinitely) greater than the absolute value of the sum of the negative 
local values of U-V, then U is better than V. 
 
Differential Indifference: For any two worlds U and V having the 
same locations, if the sum of the non-negative local values of U-V is 
finite and equal to the absolute value of the sum of the negative local 
values of U-V, then U is equally as good as V. 
 
We believe that these principles are plausible. The desirability of 
moving from world U to world V is determined by whether the gains exceed 
the losses. If the total gains G and the total losses L are finite, we follow the 
classical sum rule and judge V as better (respectively: equally good, worse,) 
than U just in case the gains exceed (respectively: equal, are less than) the 
losses. If the total gains (respectively: losses) are infinitely large and the total 
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losses (respectively: gains) are finite, then again, it seems plausible to 
conclude V is better (respectively: worse) than U. Finally, if both the gains and 
the losses are infinite, then silence is appropriate. 
It’s worth noting that Differential Indifference is considerably stronger 
than the principle (entailed by Sum) that worlds with equal finite sums are 
equally valuable. To see this, consider the following example: 
 
Locations: l1 l2 l3 l4 l5 … 
World X -1 ½ 1/4 1/8 1/16 … 
World X′ 1 1 1 1 1 … 
World X′′ 0 3/2 5/4 9/8 17/16 … 
 
Table 7 
 
Sum is silent about the ranking of X′′ and X′, for each sum is infinite. 
Differential Indifference, however, judges them equally good. It does this 
because X′′-X′ is simply X , and X  is equally as valuable as its zero world 
(because for X the sum of its negative values is -1 and the sum of its positive 
values is 1). This is an example of the power of Zero Independence implicit in 
Differential Indifference. 
In the appendix, we prove the following: 
 
Theorem 2: The conjunction of Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and Zero 
Independence entails the conjunction of Differential Betterness and 
Differential Indifference, but not vice-versa. Nonetheless, they generate the 
 25 
same ranking rule. 
 
 To intuitively explain the content of this theorem, we need to explain 
two things. One is why the conjunction of Differential Betterness and 
Differential Indifferences is strictly weaker than the conjunction of our four 
principles. The other is to explain how two non-equivalent sets of conditions 
can nonetheless generate the same ranking rule.  
 The conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential 
Indifference is strictly weaker than the conjunction of our four principles. This 
is to say that each binary relation that satisfies Transitivity, Sum, Loose 
Pareto, and Zero Independence also satisfies Differential Betterness and 
Differential Indifference, but not vice versa. The vice-versa claim does not 
hold because the conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential 
Indifference has no implications for the ranking of case 4 (above) pairs (i.e., 
where the sum of the non-negative differences in value is infinite and the sum 
of the negative differences in values is infinitely negative), whereas the 
conjunction of our four principles do have some (conditional) implications for 
such cases. . Let x and y, y and z, and z and x, each be a case 4 pair. The 
conjunction of the two differential principles is silent about each of these 
rankings, and is thus compatible with the supposition that x is better than y, y 
better than z, but z is better than x (a violation of transitivity). Our four 
principles—which include Transitivity—however, are incompatible with this 
supposition. Thus, the conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential 
Indifference does not entail the conjunction of our four principles.  
 Although the conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential 
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Indifference is strictly weaker than the conjunction of Transitivity, Sum, 
Loose Pareto, and Zero Indifference, they generate the same ranking rule in 
the sense that their binary rankings are the same (one world is judged at least 
as good as another by one conjunction if and only if it is also so judged by the 
other conjunction). The extra strength that comes from our four principles (and 
Transitivity in particular) is “conditional”: they generate certain additional 
results when certain other assumptions are added. This extra strength, 
however, is not present when no extra assumptions are made. Thus, for 
example, on their own, our four principles—like Differential Betterness and 
Differential Indifference—are silent about the ranking of any case 4 pair. The 
difference between the two sets of conditions emerges only when additional 
assumptions are made. Thus, if we suppose that x is better than y, y is better 
than z, and that each is a case 4 pair, then our four principles (via Transitivity) 
entail that x is better than z, but the two differential principles are silent about 
this. This difference emerges only when such additional assumptions are 
made. On their own, they have the same implications for any pair of worlds. 
Thus, the two sets of conditions generate the same ranking relation. 
Let us now compare the latter principles with some other principles in 
the literature. 
 
6. Comparisons with Vallentyne and Kagan’s SBI1 
Differential Betterness, rather interestingly, turns out to be equivalent to 
Vallentyne and Kagan's SBI1: 
 
SBI1 (Strengthened Basic Idea One): If (1) U and V have exactly the 
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same locations, and (2) for each finite set of locations there is a finite 
expansion (i.e., superset) and some positive number, k, such that 
relative to all further finite expansions U is k-better [defined below] 
than V, then U is better than V. 
 
The basic idea here is that worlds having the same locations can be 
compared by comparing the values of finite subsets of their locations, which, 
given finite additivity, are evaluated by adding values together. Roughly, if, 
relative to certain finite sets of locations, one world is judged better than a 
second, and this judgement is also true no matter how one finitely expands the 
selected set of locations, then the first world is better than the second. More 
exactly, the principle states that if, no matter what finite set of locations you 
start with, it is possible to expand this set by adding finitely more locations so 
that at some point, no matter how one further finitely expands the set, relative 
to the finite number of locations selected, the first world is k-better (i.e., has a 
total that, on some specified scale, is at least k units higher, for some fixed real 
number k) than the second, then the first world is better than the second 
(considering all locations). (The notion of k-betterness is introduced to handle 
complications that arise when sums of infinitely many values have a finite 
value.) 
 Consider, for example, an earlier example: 
 
Position: … b
-2 b-1 b0 b1 b2 … 
Team B … 0 0 0 0 0 … 
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Team B′ … 0 0 1 0 0 … 
Team B′′ … 1 1 1 1 1 … 
 
Table 8 
 
SBI1 agrees with Differential Betterness in judging B′′ as better than 
B′, and B′ as better than B. B′′ is judged better than B′  because, for any set of 
at least two locations (positions), the total goodness in B′′ in the selected 
locations is at least one unit greater than that in B′. B′ is judged better than B 
because, for any set that includes at least location b0, the total goodness in B′ 
in the selected locations is at least one unit greater than that in B. 
SBI1, it turns out, is equivalent to Differential Betterness. In the 
appendix, we prove: 
 
Theorem 3: A ranking rule, for worlds with the same locations, 
satisfies SBI1 if and only if it satisfies Differential Betterness. 
 
 Thus, Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and Zero Independence entail 
Differential Indifference and Differential Betterness, the latter of which is 
equivalent to SBI1. Given that Differential Betterness is more intuitive and 
easier to understand than SBI1, all future discussion should, we suggest, focus 
on Differential Betterness. The complex and arcane language of SBI1 no 
longer needs to be considered. 
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7. Comparisons with the Catching-Up Criterion  
In the economics literature, one of the best known finitely additive criteria for 
ranking worlds when there an infinite number of locations comes from the 
work of Atsumi (1965) and von Weizsäcker (1965): 
 
Catching-Up: One world, U, is at least as good as a second world 
(having the same locations), V, if and only if the lower limit, as T 
approaches infinity, of the sum of the values of U-V at locations 1 to T 
is at least as great as zero (that is, if and only if  
limT→∞ inf  ∑t=1,..,T (Ut-Vt) ≥ 0). 
 
This condition holds that (as with Zero Independence) the ranking of 
two worlds can be determined by considering the world that results from 
subtracting, at each location, the values of one world from those of the other 
and comparing this world with the value of its zero world. Roughly, the idea is 
that if, when enough locations are considered, the sum of these differences is 
at least as great as zero, and this remains so no matter how many additional 
locations are added in, then the first world is at least as good as the second 
world. 
 There are three ways in which Catching-Up may be too strong. First, it 
states necessary and sufficient conditions for being at least as good. Any two 
worlds that do not satisfy these conditions are deemed incomparable. A 
weaker view would state the conditions only as sufficient for betterness and 
leave open whether they may be other grounds as well. Although we shall 
endorse the stronger view below, we shall start by focusing on this weaker 
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view. 
 A second weakening of the criterion is needed to accommodate cases 
where locations have no natural structure. Atsumi and von Weizsäcker 
developed their criteria for the case where the locations were future times 
(assumed to be discrete for simplicity). They thus assume a natural structure 
for locations including a first location (the first future time relative to a time of 
evaluation). Once this assumption is dropped, their appeal to a specific 
numbering of locations (a specific way of ordering them) becomes arbitrary. 
Furthermore, one cannot simply reformulate this criterion so that it says that if 
there exists at least one way of numbering locations for which his original 
condition holds, then the first world is at least as good as the second. This 
approach is incoherent. Consider <1,1,-1,1,1,-1,1,1,-1….> and compare it to 
its zero world <0,0,0,…>. Relative to the order in which the locations are 
listed, Catching-Up judges the first world as better (the partial sums of the 
differences are <1,2,1,2,3,2,3,4,3,…..>, and thus are always greater than zero). 
If, however, the locations are listed in a different order, the opposite result can 
be obtained. For example, if locations have no natural structure, then the first 
world can also be specified by <-1,-1,1,-1,-1,1,-1,-1,1,…>, and, relative to this 
enumeration, Catching-Up says that the zero world is better. Hence, the mere 
existence of a particular enumeration that ensures that the original criterion is 
satisfied is not sufficient for being at least as good. 
 The other main way of responding to the absence of a natural order is 
to reformulate Catching-Up so that it applies only where the original condition 
is satisfied by all possible enumerations of locations. In what follows, we shall 
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invoke this weakening of the original criterion.15 
 A third way that Catching-Up may need to be weakened concerns the 
issue of whether the locations in the two worlds are the same. Atsumi and von 
Weizsäcker implicitly assume that they are (and this is plausible for the case 
of future times starting from a common point), but in general this need not be 
so. Ranking infinite worlds with different locations is a tricky business, and 
we cannot here discuss the many relevant issues.16 We shall therefore simply 
weaken Catching-Up so as to be conditional on the locations being the same in 
both worlds. 
 Taking into account the above three weakenings of Catching-Up leads 
to the following: 
 
Weak Catching-Up: If (1) U and V have the same locations, and (2) 
for all possible enumerations of locations, the lower limit, as T 
approaches infinity, of the sum of the values of U-V at locations 1 to T 
is at least as great as zero (i.e., limT→∞ inf  ∑t=1,..,T (Ut-Vt) ≥ 0), then U 
is at least as good as V. 
 
 In the appendix we prove: 
                                               
15
 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting that we pursue the 
connection between our conditions and the Weizsäcker condition weakened in 
the way just identified. 
16
 See, for example, the discussion in Vallentyne and Kagan (1997), where 
they limit assessment to worlds with a natural distance metric for locations. 
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Theorem 4: The conjunction of Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and 
Zero Independence entails Weak Catching-Up, but not vice-versa. 
Nonetheless, they generate the same ranking rule. 
 
 Given Theorem 2, it immediately follows that the ranking rule 
generated by the conjunction of Differential Betterness and Differential 
Indifference is the same as that generated by Weak Catching-Up. Indeed, in 
the appendix, we prove the following slightly stronger result: 
 
Theorem 5: A ranking rule, for worlds with the same locations, 
satisfies Weak Catching-Up if and only if it satisfies Differential 
Betterness and Differential Indifference. 
 
8. Necessary Conditions for Being At Least as Good 
The conjunction of Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and Zero Independence 
implies each of the following (equivalent) sufficient conditions for being at 
least as good: Weak Catching-Up, the conjunction of Differential Betterness 
and Differential Indifference, and the conjunction of SBI1 and Differential 
Indifference. Each of these is silent about the ranking of worlds that do not 
satisfy the imposed condition. More specifically, as discussed in Section 5, 
each is silent about the ranking of a world U and a world V if and only if (1) 
the sum of the non-negative values of U-V is infinite, and (2) the sum of the 
negative values of U-V is infinitely negative. Call two worlds that satisfy these 
two conditions a double infinity pair. Worlds <….1,1,1,1,1,…> and 
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<…2,0,2,0,2,0,2,…> are, for example, a double infinity pair. 
 The above conditions are silent for double infinity pairs. This means 
that they are compatible with the two worlds being incomparable, but also 
compatible with one of them being at least as good as the other. We believe, 
however, that, if locations have no natural structure, then double infinity pairs 
should be judged incomparable. Hence, we believe, if locations have no 
natural structure, then the above conditions should be strengthened to 
necessary and sufficient conditions. 
 We shall not, however, attempt to defend this view here. Instead, we 
shall simply show that it follows from the above conditions if one final 
seeming plausible condition is added. The condition appeals to the notion of a 
restricted transfer, which is (1) a transfer of a positive amount of value from a 
location with positive value to a location with negative value such that (2) 
after the transfer, the donor location still has non-negative value and the 
recipient location still has non-positive value. For example, the move from <-
1,3> to <0,2> is a restricted transfer, but the move from <-1,3> to <1,1> is not. 
 Consider then: 
 
Restricted Transfers: If locations have no natural structure, then, for 
any three worlds, U, U*, and V, having the same locations, if (1) U is 
better than V, and (2) U* is obtainable from U by some (possibly 
infinite) number of restricted transfers, then U* is better than V. 
 
 This condition is, we believe, plausible. Note first that the conjunction 
of Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and Differences entails that a finite number 
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of transfers (restricted or not) always preserve value rankings. The only issue, 
then, concerns infinite numbers of transfers. Clearly, many kinds of infinite 
transfers do not preserve value rankings (and are not covered by Restricted 
Transfers). For example, an infinite number of transfers from one positively 
valued location to another positively valued location does not always preserve 
value rankings. World <….1,1;1,1,1,….> is (by Strong Pareto) better than 
<…1,1;0,1,1,…>, but the latter is not better than itself—even though it can be 
obtained from the former by transferring, for all locations to the right of the 
semi-colon (here used only to identify a specific location), one unit of value 
one location to the right. An unrestricted transfer principle is for these reasons 
implausible. 
Restricted Transfers are uni-directional: they always have the effect of 
moving both the donor and recipient locations closer to zero. The effect of one 
restricted transfer on a given location cannot be reversed by some other 
restricted transfer. We shall not, however, here insist on the plausibility of 
Restricted Transfers. We wish merely to note that, in the presence of the other 
four conditions (Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, and Zero Independence), it 
requires incomparability in all those cases where the four principles are jointly 
silent. For this purpose, consider the following condition: 
 
Full Weak Catching-Up: If U and V have the same locations, and 
locations have no natural structure, then U is at least as good as V if 
and only if, for all possible enumerations of locations, the lower limit, 
as T approaches infinity, of the sum of the values of U-V at locations 1 
to T is at least as great as zero (i.e., limT→∞ inf  ∑t=1,..,T (Ut-Vt) ≥ 0). 
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This is exactly like Weak Catching-Up, except that (1) it asserts that 
satisfaction of the limit condition for all possible enumerations is necessary 
and sufficient (and not merely sufficient) for being at least as good, and (2) it 
is conditional on locations not having any natural structure. The second 
qualification is necessary, since where locations have a natural structure it is 
not necessary that the limit condition hold for all possible enumerations. It 
only needs to hold for certain kinds of (e.g., isometric) structure-preserving 
enumerations. 
 We can now characterize the Full Weak Catching-Up (proof in 
appendix): 
 
Theorem 6: There is only one ranking rule, for worlds with the same 
locations, that satisfies Transitivity, Sum, Loose Pareto, Zero 
Independence, and Restricted Transfers. It is the Full Weak Catching-
Up rule. 
 
 Where locations are the same and have no natural structure, 
satisfaction of the von Weizsäcker limit condition for all possible 
enumerations—which is equivalent to the conjunction of the conditions 
imposed by Differential Betterness and Differential Indifference—provides 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being at least as good. We believe that 
Restricted Transfers, and hence Full Weak Catching-Up, is plausible, but 
cannot here undertake a defense of Restricted Transfers. 
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9. Conclusion 
We have argued that Hamkins and Montero are mistaken to reject Weak 
Pareto and endorse Isomorphism. We did this by defending Zero 
Independence, which ranks U and V on the basis of their differences in local 
value. The conjunction of Zero Independence with Sum and Loose Pareto 
(which Hamkins and Montero endorse) entails Weak Pareto (indeed Strong 
Pareto) and is incompatible with Isomorphism. 
 We also showed that the conjunction of Sum, Loose Pareto, and Zero 
Independence entails the conjunction of Differential Betterness and 
Differential Indifferences (each of which ranks two worlds U and V on the 
basis of U-V). We further showed that Differential Betterness is equivalent to 
Vallentyne and Kagan’s SBI1, and that the conjunction of Differential 
Betterness and Differential Indifference is equivalent to a weakened version of 
Catching-Up developed by Atsumi and by von Weizsäcker. This general 
convergence of results from different sources thus provides some indirect 
support for each. In particular, it provides indirect support for Zero 
Independence, since, in the framework of finitely additive theories, 
Transitivity, Sum, and Loose Pareto are not very controversial. 
Finally, we suggested that, where locations have no natural order, the 
above principles exhaust the plausible judgements. The conditions that they 
hold are sufficient for one world being at least as good as another are also 
necessary. We did not defend this suggestion, but we did show that it follows 
if one further accepts the Restricted Transfers principle that we formulated. 
Defense of this principle must await another occasion. 
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Appendix 
 
Theorem 1: The conjunction of Sum, Loose Pareto, and Difference entails 
Strong Pareto (and hence Weak Pareto). 
 
Proof: Omitted. 
 
Theorem 2: The conjunction of Transitivity (T), Sum (S), Loose Pareto (LP), 
and Zero Independence (ZI) entails the conjunction of Differential Betterness 
(DB) and Differential Indifference (DI), but not vice-versa. Nonetheless, they 
generate the same ranking rule. 
 
Proof: The proof is split up into two parts. Part A shows that the 
conjunction of T, S, LP, and ZI entails DB and DI. The ‘not vice-versa’ part 
is explained in Section 5 (the conjunction of DI and DB does not entail T). 
Part B shows that both sets of axioms generate the same ranking rule. 
Throughout, U and V denote two worlds with the same (countable infinitely 
many) locations, G is the sum of the non-negative local values (set at zero if 
there are none), and L the sum of the negative local values, of U-V (set at 
zero if there are none). 
 
A.   The conjunction of T, S, LP, and ZI entails DB and DI. 
A1.  The conjunction of T, S, LP, and ZI entails DB. 
Suppose that U and V satisfy the antecedent clause of DB. We have to show 
that (according to the conjunction of T, S, LP and ZI) U is better than V. 
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The hypothesis implies that L is finite and G is (finitely or infinitely) greater 
than -L≥0.  
If G is finite, then G+L>0 and S implies that U-V is better than its zero 
world. Apply ZI and conclude that U is better than V. If G is infinite, let G* 
be like U-V except with 0 wherever U-V has a negative value, and let L* be 
like U-V except that it has 0 wherever U-V has positive value and has the 
absolute (hence positive) value where the values are negative. This ensures 
that U-V = G*-L*, and thus that U and V will be ranked as G* and L* are 
(by ZI). Given that L is finite, L* is equally as valuable, by S, as any other 
world with the same finite (positive) total |L|. Let W be such a world, with 
(a) |L| spread out over only locations which have positive value in G*, and 
(b) so that the values in W are always non-negative and less than those in 
G*. Such a construction is always possible, since G is infinite and L is 
finite. By S, W is equally good as L*, and by Strong Pareto (which holds in 
virtue of Theorem 1), G* is better than W. Hence, G* is better than L*. 
Consequently, U is better than V. 
 
A.2. The conjunction of T, S, LP, and ZI entails DI. 
Suppose that U and V satisfy the antecedent clause of DI. It follows that G 
and L are finite and G+L=0. According to S, we have that U-V is equally 
good as its zero world. Apply ZI and conclude that U is equally as good as 
V. 
 
B.   Here we prove that the domain of the rule generated by T, S, LP, and ZI 
coincides with the domain of the conjunction of DB and DI. From Part A it 
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follows that the domain of the rule generated by T, S, LP, and ZI includes 
the domain of the conjunction of DB and DI. From their definitions it is 
clear that DB and DI are silent on a pair if and only if it is a double infinity 
pair (i.e., a pair, U and V, for which the sum of the non-negative values (G) 
and the sum of the negative values (L) are each infinite). Hence, it is 
sufficient to show that the rule generated by T, S, LP, and ZI is also silent 
on double infinity pairs. 
 We define a collection of rules that satisfy T, S, LP, ZI, and 
completeness. The definition is as follows: since we consider infinite worlds 
with the same countably many locations, the locations can be indexed by 
the set N = {0,1,2,…,n,…} of natural numbers (of course, this numbering is 
not unique). Next, let F be a free ultrafilter on the set of natural numbers, 
i.e. F is a collection of subsets of N that satisfy: 
• Finite sets do not belong to F, 
• If both A and B are in F, then the intersection A ∩ B is in F, 
• If A is in F and B is a superset of A (i.e. B includes A), then B is in F, 
• For each set of natural numbers A, either A or its complement N \ A is in 
F. 
 The existence of a free ultrafilter follows from the axiom of choice 
(Zorn's lemma). Each free ultrafilter defines a limit operator.17 Let a = 
(a0,a1,…,an,…) be a sequence of numbers, then limF a selects the limit point of 
                                               
17
 See, for instance, Robert E. Edwards, Functional analysis, theory and 
applications (New York: Holt, Reinhard and Winston, 1965) or James 
Dugundji, Topology (New Delhi: Universal Book Stall, 1990). 
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a subsequence of an indexed by a set that belongs to F. For example, let F 
contain the set {1,3,5,…} of odd numbers and let a = (1,0,2,0,3,0,4,…), then 
limFa  =  0. Indeed, the subsequence of the odd indexed locations reads 
0,0,…,0,… and has a limit equal to 0. Similarly, in case F' is a free ultrafilter 
that contains the set of even numbers, then limF' a = +∞. Indeed, now we can 
restrict a to the subsequence (1,2,3,4…) of the even indexed locations. The 
limit operator limF is well defined in the sense that each sequence obtains a 
unique value. 
 We define the following ranking rule: 
 
Let U and V be two worlds with the same (countable infinite set of) 
locations. Then U is 
at least as good as V if and only if limF Σ(Uk-Vk) ≥ 0. 
 
This rule satisfies reflexivity, T18, S19, LP, and ZI (and hence, by Part A, 
                                               
18
 Let F be a free ultrafilter and suppose that according to limF world U is at 
least as good as V and V is at least as good as W. Hence, limF Σ(Uk-Vk) ≥ 0 and 
limF Σ(Vk-Wk) ≥ 0. Let A collect the locations n for which Σk=0,…,n (Uk-Vk) ≥ 0. 
Let B collect the locations n for which Σk=0,…,n (Vk-Wk) ≥ 0. Then A and B both 
belong to F. Therefore, the intersection C = A ∩ B also belongs to F. As a 
consequence, for each n in C, we have Σ
 k=0,…,n (Uk-Wk) ≥ 0. As C belongs to 
F, we obtain that limF Σ(Uk-Wk) ≥ 0. Therefore, U is at least as good as W.    
19
 Here we use the fact that each subsequence of a converging sequence 
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also DB and DI). In addition, this rule is complete, i.e. this rule is able to 
judge any pair U, V of worlds. The intersection of all these limF principles 
includes the ranking rule generated by T, S, LP, and ZI. Furthermore, in 
defining a limF principle there are two moments of choice (or arbitrariness): 
first, we number the set of locations, and secondly, we select an ultrafilter. 
 
B1.  Now consider a double infinity pair U and V (i.e. both G and L are 
infinite). In this case there are infinitely many locations at which U-V is 
positive and infinitely many locations at which U-V is negative. Select a 
finite set S of locations such that ΣS(Uk-Vk) > 1 (this is possible because G is 
infinite). In numbering the locations, we start with this set S. Expanding S, 
we number the locations in such a way that at infinitely many locations the 
partial sum becomes greater than 1. Let F be a free ultrafilter that contains 
the set of these locations (where the partial sum is greater than 1). Then, 
according to the rule limF , world U is better than V. If we repeat this 
construction with U and V interchanged, then we end up with a rule (that 
satisfies T, S, LP, and ZI) that considers V better than U (i.e., the opposite 
ranking). Hence, the conjunction of T, S, LP, and ZI is silent when G and L 
are each infinite. 
Conclusion: The rule generated by S, LP, and ZI is silent if and only if G 
and L are both infinite, which is precisely when the conjunction of DB and 
                                                                                                                           
converges to the same limit. Note also that if the series Σ(Uk-Vk) converges 
absolutely then the value of limF Σ(Uk-Vk) does not depend upon how the 
locations are numbered and upon which free ultrafilter is considered. 
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DI is silent. 
 
Theorem 3: A ranking rule, for worlds with the same locations, satisfies 
SBI1 if and only if it satisfies Differential Betterness. 
 
Proof: Let U and V be any two worlds, and let G be the sum of the non-
negative local values of U-V (set at zero if there are none) and let L be the 
sum of the negative local values (set at zero if there are none), of U-V. 
A. DB entails SBI1. 
Suppose that the antecedent condition of SBI1 (concerning finite 
expansions) is satisfied. By definition, L is negative, and there are two cases 
to consider: 
(1) Suppose first that L is finite. In this case, it is sufficient to show that 
G+L is positive (since DB will then judge U as better than V, as required). 
We do this by deriving a contradiction from the supposition that G is less 
than or equal to the absolute value of L. If so, then G and L are both finite 
and the sum of the values in U-V absolutely converges to G+L, which is 
less than or equal to zero. If so, then for each positive k there exists a finite 
expansion such that (i) the restriction of U-V to this expansion adds up to a 
number less than k and (ii) all further expansions generate a total less than k. 
This is in conflict with the assumption that the antecedent conditions of 
SBI1 are satisfied. Hence, G+L is positive, and thus DB judges that U is 
better than V, as required by SBI1. 
(2) Suppose next that L converges to minus infinity. If so, then there are 
infinitely many locations with a negative utility. Take any finite set S of 
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locations such that the restriction of U-V to this set adds up to a positive 
number (given that antecedent conditions of SBI1 hold, such a set S must 
exist). Then add enough locations with a negative amount of utility and this 
superset will end up with a negative total. This, however, contradicts the 
assumption that the antecedent conditions of SBI1 hold. Hence, this case is 
impossible. 
Conclusion: Only the first case is possible and in it DB ensures that U is 
judged better than V. Hence, the consequent clause of SBI1 holds. 
B. SBI1 entails DB. 
Suppose that the antecedent of DB is true, that is, G+L is (finitely or 
infinitely) positive, say G+L>ε>0. For this to be so, L must be finite, and G 
is either finite (and greater than -L) or infinite. In either case, let k=ε/2>0. 
Then, no matter what finite set of locations one starts with, one can finitely 
expand it so that, relative to any further finite expansion, the sum of the 
values in U in this set is k-greater than the sum of the values in V in this set. 
Hence SBI1 ensures that U is better than V, as required by DB. 
 
Theorem 4: The conjunction of Transitivity (T), Sum (S), Loose Pareto (LP), 
and Zero Independence (ZI) entails Weak Weizsäcker (WW), but not vice-
versa. Nonetheless, they generate the same ranking rule. 
 
Proof: First, observe that WW does not entail T (cf. proof of Theorem 2, Part 
A). Next, from the definition it follows that when applied to a pair of U and V 
with G, or L, or both, finite, WW agrees with the conjunction of T, S, LP, and 
ZI. Indeed, in this case limT→∞ inf  ∑t=1,..,T (Ut-Vt) does not depend upon the 
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particular enumeration of the locations and is equal to limT→∞  ∑t=1,..,T (Ut-Vt). 
Hence, it is sufficient to show that WW is silent for double infinity pairs. 
Now, if U and V is a double infinity pair, then one can define a limF principle 
(cf. Part B1 in the proof of Theorem 2) such that limF ∑ (Ut-Vt) < 0. Therefore, 
with respect to the corresponding enumeration, one has that lim inf 
 
∑
 
(Ut-Vt) ≤ 
limF ∑ (Ut-Vt) < 0. Repeat this construction with U and V interchanged, and 
obtain another enumeration for which lim inf 
 
∑
 
(Vt-Ut) < 0. Conclude that 
WW is silent for double infinity pairs and that WW coincides with the rule 
generated by T, S, LP, and ZI. 
 
Theorem 5: A ranking rule, for worlds with the same locations, satisfies 
Weak Weizsäcker (WW) if and only if it satisfies Differential Betterness (DB) 
and Differential Indifference (DI). 
 
Proof: Both WW and the conjunction of DB and DI are silent on a pair if an 
only if it is a double infinity pair. Therefore, the statement is implied by the 
previous theorem in combination with Theorem 2. 
 
Theorem 6: There is only one ranking rule, for worlds with the same 
locations, that satisfies Transitivity (T), Sum (S), Loose Pareto (LP), Zero 
Independence (ZI), and Restricted Transfers (RT). It is the Full Weak 
Weizsäcker rule (FWW). 
 
Proof: In view of Theorem 4, it is sufficient to show that (i) FWW satisfies 
RT, and (ii) in case of a double infinity pair, RT turns combined with the 
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conjunction of T, S, LP, and ZI into entails silence incomparability. 
(i) Let (according to FWW) world U be better than V. Theorem 4 implies 
that L is finite and G is (finitely or infinitely) greater than -L. We show that 
by introducing axiom RT the ranking of U and V is not affected. The total 
goodness that RT allows to be transferred does not exceed -L. After a 
restricted transfer of K units, U is changed into U*, G decreases to G-K, and 
L increases to L+K with -L > K≥ 0. The inequality G > -L implies G-K > -L-
K ≥ 0. Therefore, U* is better than V. In this case, RT is entailed by the 
conjunction of T, S, LP, and ZI. Hence, FWW satisfies RT. 
(ii) Consider a double infinity pair U and V, that is, for which G and L are 
both infinite. According to FWW such a pair is incomparable. We show that 
the conjunction of T, S, LP, ZI, and RT entails incomparability. This is 
done by contradiction: assume U is not worse than V. Fix a location l for 
which n = Ul-Vl is negative. By RT, the local differences at all other 
locations can (with an infinite number of restricted transfers) be brought to 
zero without affecting the ranking of U and V. Hence, after these transfers, 
the local gains add up to 0 and the local losses to n. By S and ZI, world V 
should be better than U. This contradicts the initial assumption. 
Conclusion: the conjunction of T, S, LP, ZI, and RT entails that double 
infinity pairs are incomparable and elsewhere it coincides with FWW. 
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